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This paper aims to present a theory of consciousness called the Reversed Theater Theory, 5 
which gives the phenomenal consciousness a functional role in cognition. According to the theory, 6 
there is a theater in the brain, but a Reversed Cartesian Theater that the actors are the consciousness 7 
and the audience is the unconsciousness; actors mechanically act according to the script, while the 8 
audience enjoys its content. When a performance is over, the audience compiles the next script 9 
based on their experience so that the stage continues. 10 
 11 
Keywords: Consciousness; Cognitive phenomenology. 12 
 13 
1. Introduction 14 
The Cartesian theater is a widely opposed view of consciousness, which holds that the infor-15 
mation from various sub-systems of the brain is collected in a specific order to form a movie and 16 
provided to an inner observer or homunculus in a privileged place to produce conscious experience. 17 
(Dennett, 1993). 18 
Some opponents of this view claim that the information sharing between sub-systems does 19 
not need to be organized in a continuous sequence to be provided to an inner observer in order to 20 
become a unified experience. In contrast, it is because the information of those sub-systems are 21 
unified and coherent at the level of content that they count as the experiences of a single self; i.e., 22 
they cohere in their contents as if they were the experiences of an ongoing self. (Dennett, 1993); 23 
consciousness is just brain-wide information sharing (Dehaene, 2014), and the accompanying phe-24 
nomenal characters are just non-functional byproducts.  25 
This paper aims to develop a consciousness theory between classical Cartesian theater and 26 
the epiphenomenalism of phenomenal consciousness, which denies consciousness as the inner ob-27 
server of a privileged position in the brain while retaining its identity as the participant of cognition 28 
by giving it a constitutive functional role in the processing of mental representations. We refer to 29 
it as the Reversed Theater Theory or the Reversed Cartesian Theater. 30 
2. Mental Representation 31 
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A mental representation is a mental item with semantic properties or semantically evaluable. 32 
A complex mental representation is composed of its constituents, and its meaning is determined 33 
by those constituents and the structure formed by them. Most perceptual representations have com-34 
positional structure. For example, the perceptual system can bind together a representation of 35 
shape and a representation of size to form a complex representation that an object has a certain 36 
shape and size. The mental representations in high-level human thought are more complex. 37 
In a loose sense, we not only call the representations of the parts of the object of mental 38 
representation A as the constituents of A (e.g., the red or green light of a traffic light is its compo-39 
nent) but also call the mental representations of other objects that are in a functional system with 40 
the object of A as the constituents of A (e.g., traffic lights, cars, and an intersection make up a 41 
traffic system.) It is only for the simplification of terminology and interpretation. At least, if we 42 
want a proper understanding of traffic lights, the understanding of other objects in the traffic sys-43 
tem is essential. If we understand the traffic system in order to understand the traffic lights, then it 44 
is reasonable to consider the understanding of this system as part of the understanding of the traffic 45 
lights. (According to more rigorous practice, the relevant context should be supplemented with a 46 
description of the system to which the representation in question belongs). 47 
2.1 Clarity  48 
 49 
For a subject X, the content richness of the phenomenal character of a certain object presents 50 
to her may be different at different times or in different situations. We call this content richness 51 
the clarity of the related mental representation. The higher the clarity, the richer the content of its 52 
phenomenal character. 53 
There is a paradigm example of this definition, and we call it the flash-check example: some-54 
one perceives a word (or sentence) that suddenly flashes in her mind, and it arouses her interest, 55 
so she takes a more detailed look at it. We regard the related mental representation when the word 56 
flashes in her mind and the corresponding mental representation when thinking about the word 57 
more carefully as the same mental representation with distinct clarity. The clarity of the former is 58 
lower than that of the latter. 59 
When a word or sentence flashes through one's mind, she acquires a related mental represen-60 
tation; this mental representation may make her in a phenomenal state accompanied by a discrim-61 
ination ability conferred on her (or a tendency to possess this ability): given the required observa-62 
tion and intelligence, the ability to classify any object or state of affairs into two categories based 63 
on whether it is the object of the mental representation. For example, one's understanding of the 64 
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statement "There is a teacup in the room" is reflected in her ability to discriminate a teacup from 65 
a teapot or another object and in the fact that when a teacup in a particular room is shown to her, 66 
she takes the statement to be true in that context. We refer to the discrimination ability obtained 67 
by X according to the content of any mental representation A as the discrimination ability of A. 68 
Most mental representations are compositional. It means that the discrimination ability of a 69 
specific representation conferred on the subject is based on the structure and constituents of the 70 
representation. The structure and those constituents also have the discrimination abilities related 71 
to themselves. 72 
Suppose SA is a phenomenal state of X with mental representation A as its object. We define 73 
the following two different cognitive content phenomenology: (also refer to the table below) 74 
 75 
 Non-structural phenomenology:  76 
Non-structural phenomenal states are states with non-structural phenomenology, 77 
and they have non-structural phenomenal characters. If SA is a non-structural phenomenal 78 
state and X is in SA, then there is something for X that it is like to consciously entertain the 79 
content of A, and this phenomenal state puts X into a state that with the discrimination ability 80 
of A. 81 
 82 
 Structural phenomenology:  83 
Structural phenomenal states are states with structural phenomenology, and they 84 
have structural phenomenal characters. If SA is a structural phenomenal state and X is in SA, 85 
then X is in three different non-structural phenomenal states at the same time; they are the 86 
non-structural phenomenal states of (i) A, of (ii) the structure of A, and of (iii) the constituents 87 
of A. 88 





P1: There is something that it is like to 




P1: There is something that it is like to 
consciously entertain the content of A 
P2: There is something that it is like to 
consciously entertain the content of the 
structure of A. 
P3: There is something that it is like to 
consciously entertain the content of the 
constituents of A. 
F1: A 
 
F2: Structure of A 
 
F3: Constituents of A 
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It can be seen from the definition that non-structural phenomenology is a subset of structural 89 
phenomenology. In the same way, if X is in a structural phenomenal state, then she is also in a 90 
corresponding non-structural phenomenal state; and structural phenomenal characters include cor-91 
responding non-structural phenomenal characters. 92 
Now we can rank the clarity of mental representations according to the definitions of struc-93 
tural and non-structural phenomenology above. There are definitions of the four levels of clarity. 94 
(also refer to the table below) 95 
 96 
 Level 0 clarity (c0): Mental representation A has level 0 clarity (A(c0)) or A is a c0 represen-97 
tation (unconscious representation), if X is not in a non-structural phenomenal state of A. 98 
 99 
 Level 1 clarity (c1): Mental representation A has level 1 clarity (A(c1)) or A is a c1 represen-100 
tation, if X is in a non-structural phenomenal state of A but not in a structural phenomenal 101 
state of A. 102 
 103 
 Level 2 clarity (c2): Mental representation A has level 2 clarity (A(c2)) or A is a c2 represen-104 
tation, if X is in a structural phenomenal state of A but not in a structural phenomenal state of 105 
the constituents (and structure) of A. In other words, the constituents (and structure) of A have 106 
level 1 clarity. 107 
 108 
 Level 3 clarity (c3): Mental representation A has level 3 clarity (A(c3)) or A is a c3 represen-109 
tation, if X is in a structural phenomenal state of A and its constituents but not in a structural 110 
phenomenal state of the constituents of A's constituents. In other words, the constituents of A 111 










A(c0) Unconscious Unconscious Unconscious 
A(c1) Non-structural Unconscious Unconscious 
A(c2) Structural Non-structural Unconscious 
A(c3) Structural Structural Non-structural 
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These classifications can be typically applied to the previous flash-check example: a word 114 
flashes through someone's mind at t1; the mental representation A corresponding to the word is a 115 
c2 representation or A(t1, c2). The subject thinks about the word carefully at t2, at which time A 116 
is transformed into a c3 representation or A(t2, c3). So we get a description of the mental process 117 
related to A: < A(t1,c2), A(t2,c3) >. 118 
If we refer to the constituents of mental representation A, the constituents of those constituents, 119 
etc., as the sub-representations of A, then A is based on its sub-representations. Any mental repre-120 
sentation must include abundant sub-representations below c2, namely, c0 and c1 sub-representa-121 
tions (otherwise, it will cause vicious regress). Compared with the c2 and c3 representations, we 122 
have less or no phenomenal consciousness of them. However, these sub-representations are also 123 
the basis of A. They may be token by some physical events that cannot be evaluated semantically, 124 
such as the specific activation patterns of some neural networks. 125 
2.2 Digraph Structure 126 
 127 
For many mental representations, their constituents cannot independently represent certain 128 
characteristics of their objects. For example, the car cannot be a characteristic of the traffic light 129 
independently. However, the constituents of a mental representation can represent some of its 130 
characteristics in an interconnected way, although those constituents themselves do not show the 131 
relations. For example, compared to a representation of an actual physical object, the representa-132 
tion of shape of an object in a painting is not tied to a representation of weight; a representation of 133 
[car] does not show itself as a constituent of the meaning of the representation of [traffic light] 134 
independently. 135 
 In this paper, we do not focus on the complete structure of various types of mental represen-136 
tations but a separable feature shared by those structures: there are some semantic relations be-137 
tween the constituents of mental representations, thus forming a network structure. The nodes of 138 
a network structure are the constituents of the mental representation in question, and the connec-139 
tions between the nodes are the compositional relations between them caused by the semantic 140 
relevance. 141 
The network structure of a mental representation usually has directionality or sequentiality. 142 
For example:  143 
 144 
1. For a representation of [event p causes event q], the representation of [event p] precedes the 145 
representation of [event q].  146 
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2. For a representation of [<p, p→q, q>], there is a sequence from [p] to [p→q] to [q]. 147 
3. For a representation of [p&q→r], the relation representation of [&] precedes the relation rep-148 
resentation of [→] (if [&] and [→] are not regarded as syntactic components).  149 
4. A representation of shape and a representation of size of a physical object limit the represen-150 
tation of weight and the representation of material of that object. 151 
5. If we care about the internal structure of traffic lights, then the representation of [current] and 152 
[voltage] should be restricted by the representation of [circuit diagram]. 153 
 154 
We refer to such directional or sequential network structure of a mental representation as to 155 
the digraph structure of that representation. 156 
The directionality of the digraph structure is not a syntactic property. In contrast, it is a place-157 
holder used to represent those substantial semantic relations between nodes; e.g., the relations 158 
between those representations in (4) can be expressed as "S(shape)&S(size)→S(weight)&S(mate-159 
rial)." We refer to these directional compositional relations as the (semantic) constraint relations 160 
between the related representations. 161 
3. Misconceptions 162 
In the flash-check example, the subject has experienced a mental process that can be described 163 
as <A(t1,c2), A(t2,c3)>: The word flashes through the subject's mind at t1, and the mental repre-164 
sentation A has level 2 clarity or A(t1, c2). That is to say, A is a structural representation, and the 165 
constituents of A are non-structural representations at t1. When the subject carefully thinks about 166 
the word at t2, A has level 3 clarity or A(t2, c3). That is to say, A and its constituents are structural 167 
representations, and the constituents of A'constituents are non-structural representations at t2. 168 
We will focus on the details of that process, i.e., how A(t1,c2) is transformed into A(t2,c3). 169 
There are some misconceptions about the process of <A(t1,c2), A(t2,c3)>, and we make up typical 170 
representatives for the two most important types: the Free Exploration Theory and the Magnifi-171 
cation Theory. 172 
3.1 Free Exploration Theory 173 
 174 
According to the Free Exploration Theory, a series of explorations of a c1 representation with 175 
absolute freedom via the active use of conceptual abilities suffices to transform it into a c2 repre-176 
sentation; this mechanism forms the basis of the transformation from c2 to c3. 177 
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The error of this theory is that it overemphasizes the autonomy of conceptual abilities and 178 
ignores the implicit structural information of c1 representation, which makes a constitutive contri-179 
bution to the formation of the corresponding c2 representation. 180 
There are usually some compositional relations and constraint relations between the constit-181 
uents of a conceptual representation. It is still applicable even if the structure and constituents of 182 
a mental representation have no explicit phenomenology (e.g., c1 representation); in this case, 183 
those relations act as unconscious components of the representation. The transformation from c1 184 
representation to c2 representation is at least partly guided by those fixed compositional relations 185 
and constraint relations. 186 
The content of this objection is taken for granted as a part of compositionality but is easy to 187 
be ignored in the context of mental processes, which leads to those free exploration theories. 188 
3.2 Magnification Theory 189 
 190 
According to the Magnification Theory, the thinking process of transforming A(t1,c2) into 191 
A(t2,c3) is similar to the process of studying a rock through a magnifying glass. In the rock research, 192 
we obtain a blurred image of the rock with naked eyes at t1; a series of separate inspection of the 193 
details of that blurred image through a magnifying glass is enough to transform the blurred image 194 
into a clear one at t2. Correspondingly, separate upgrades of the clarity of A's constituents suffice 195 
to transform A(t1,c2) into A(t2,c3). 196 
For example, A is a c2 representation at t1, composed of representation B and representation 197 
C in structure B→C. Also, B1 and B2 are the constituents of B; C1 and C2 are the constituents of C. 198 
Subject X has such a configuration of main mental representations at t1:  199 
 200 
 A(c2); 201 
 B(c1), C(c1); 202 
 B1(c0), B2(c0), C1(c0), C2(c0). 203 
 204 
X upgrades the clarity of those mental representations separately, which makes her put herself 205 
into this configuration of main mental representations at t2: 206 
 207 
 A(c3); 208 
 B(c2), C(c2); 209 




In the Magnification Theory, c1 representations (non-structural representations) are trans-212 
formed into c2 representations (structural representations) through the related digraph structure, 213 
which can be seen as the avoidance of the shortcoming of the Free Exploration Theory. However, 214 
this approach did not enable A to achieve complete semantic relevance in the transformation from 215 
c2 to c3. The complete semantic relevance of a c3 representation includes not only the constraint 216 
relations within its constituents (some c2 representations) but also the cross-representation con-217 
straint relations between the constituents of those "structured" c2 representations. 218 
For example, the content of mental representation A is "Bella killed Carl." B (Bella shoots a 219 
bullet at Carl) and C (Carl's death) are its two crucial constituents, and the related digraph structure 220 
is B→C (B leads to C). A structural representation generated via the digraph structure can be ex-221 
pressed as B→C* (B caused C, and Carl died due to the shot), which is a c2 representation. To 222 
transform that c2 representation into a c3 representation, we need to sequentially transform B(c1) 223 
and C(c1) into c2 representations. Suppose that B1 (the type of Bella's bullet) is a constituent of B, 224 
and C1 (Carl's injury) is a constituent of C. Then, because there is a cross-representation constraint 225 
relation between B1 and C1, the final A(c3) should have the structure "B→C* & B1→C1*" as a part 226 
of it, which means "B leads to C, and the damage of Carl caused by a bullet of Bella of a specific 227 
type led to his death." 228 
In short, the constraint relation B→C of A(c2) should be reconstructed during the transfor-229 
mation from A(c2) to A(c3). B→C is just a placeholder that neither represents a clearly defined 230 
syntactic symbol nor any substantial semantic content. If it appears in A(c2), then it is an explan-231 
atory symbol designating that C(c1) has been semantically restricted by B(c1). If it appears in the 232 
transformation from A(c2) to A(c3), then it shows the digraph structure of A(c2) and contributes to 233 
the process by guiding the sequence of transformation. When the transformation has been com-234 
pleted, the placeholder B→C is replaced by other placeholders that represent the cross-represen-235 
tation constraint relations between the constituents of B and C. 236 
There may be a defense of the Magnification Theory that B→C of A(c2) is an unconscious 237 
version of the corresponding part of A(c3). In other words, although the constituents of B(c1) and 238 
C(c1) in A(c2) (i.e., some c0 representations) are not phenomenally conscious, they play similar 239 
roles as those corresponding c2 representations in A(c3). We should consider A(c2) to be an "ana-240 
log sketch" of A(c3). 241 
Although many c2 representations are actually "analog sketches" of the corresponding c3 242 
representations in the sense of content or information, we should attribute those structural similar-243 
ities to their intentionality in principle. In other words, because they are about the same external 244 
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object, they acquire similarity in content. If we shift the context from introspection to actual cog-245 
nitive situations, we can recognize it more clearly. In actual cognitive situations, part of the rele-246 
vant information is stored in the world rather than the mind. For example, someone enters her 247 
room and finds a broken teacup on the ground at t1. She intuitively establishes the assumption that 248 
it is her cat that caused the event. We use A to represent the subject's mental representation of the 249 
event. Correspondingly, B is a representation of [a series of behaviors of her cat], and C is a rep-250 
resentation of [the broken teacup]. Her assumption A(c2) is mainly composed of B(c1) and C(c1) 251 
with the structure B→C. To better understand the event, she will transform A(t1,c2) into A(t2,c3) 252 
by checking the details of her room. The process will be achieved by sequentially transforming 253 
B(c1) and C(c1) into B(c2) and C(c2). The constituents of B(c2) include the position of the chair 254 
she has not paid close attention to, and the constituents of C(c2) include the way her teacup was 255 
broken which requires a more detailed inspection. These constituents cannot be the parts of 256 
A(t1,c2), whether conscious or unconscious. Just as a defense of a hypothesis in science comes 257 
from experimental results rather than the process of conceiving the hypothesis, the justification of 258 
an assumption in cognition is the follow-up information/beliefs rather than the way of establishing 259 
that assumption. 260 
4. Reversed Cartesian Theater 261 
4.1 Digraph Filling Theory 262 
 263 
Based on the analysis of those above two wrong theories, we have developed some reflective 264 
understandings of the transformation from c2 to c3. Integrating them in a reasonable way will 265 
allow us to obtain another theory of the transformation process, which we refer to as the Digraph 266 
Filling Theory. 267 
The meaning of any mental representation A is determined by its constituents and the way 268 
they are arranged. To describe the utilization of the digraph structure of a mental representation in 269 
a simpler way, we use the term "digraph framework." The digraph framework of A(c2) (or A(c2)-270 
framework) has the same digraph structure as A(c2), but its constituents are not those constituents 271 
of A(c2) but the designators of them. A designator of any mental representation is a specialized 272 
placeholder, which means that the node position it occupies can be filled with the mental repre-273 
sentation it refers to. 274 
According to the Digraph Filling Theory, the transformation from A(c2) to A(c3) mainly in-275 




1. Replace the constituents of A(c2) as their designators to generate A(c2)-framework. 278 
2. Fill in the corresponding c2 representation to A(c2)-framework sequentially so that both 279 
the in-representation and cross-representation constraint relations are established be-280 
tween the constituents of those c2 representations. 281 
4.2 Digraph Phenomenology  282 
 283 
The Digraph Filling Theory is not far from the Reversed Cartesian Theater. 284 
Mental representations involved in high-level cognitive processes are extremely complex. It 285 
is not limited to the complexity of the combination of representations of different dimensions, such 286 
as a representation of shape and a representation of size form a complex representation of shape 287 
and size. A representation in high-level human thought is closer to a network with such complex 288 
perceptual representation as one of its nodes.  289 
The complexity of a representation means a lot of calculations and time consumption, which 290 
is consistent with our common sense that we need to spend more time on conceptual thinking than 291 
recognizing the shape of objects. 292 
Since complex mental representations reuse the same brain area (a representation of my home 293 
may include visual representations of each room), and some mental processes take a long time and 294 
can be continued after being interrupted, it is reasonable to suppose that there is a mechanism for 295 
controlling the formation of complex representations and maintaining the stability of the process. 296 
In particular, that mechanism can control and maintain the transformation from c2 representations 297 
to c3 representations. 298 
According to the Digraph Filling Theory, the transformation from A(c2) to A(c3) can be di-299 
vided into two steps: 300 
 301 
1. Transform A(c2) into A(c2)-framework; 302 
2. Transform A(c2)-framework into A(c3) through a directional filling mechanism. 303 
 304 
The Reversed Theater Theory assumes a phenomenology for some of the matters that appear 305 
in the transformation from c2 representation to c3 representation. It is an irreducible and proprie-306 
tary phenomenology. The content of this phenomenology is a series of inner senses, which are 307 
functional and non-analog. We refer to it as digraph phenomenology. 308 
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Digraph phenomenology is composed of a series of inner senses. The most critical four of 309 
them and their characteristics are listed in the following table: 310 
 311 
Digraph phenomenology of the transformation from A(c2) to A(c3) 
Types Characteristics 
S1: General inner senses 
of the task state 
Enable X to know that she is in the task state of filling A(c2)-
framework. 
S2: Inner senses of the 
digraph structure of 
A(c2) 
Enable X to distinguish the digraph structure of A(c2) from those 
of other c2 representations and also distinguish the directional-
ity of the digraph structure. 
S3: Inner senses of the 
designators in A(c2)-
framework 
Enables X to distinguish between different designators in A(c2)-
framework. 
S4: Inner senses of the 
filling process 
Enable X to determine which designators in A(c2)-framework 
are filled. If the transformation needs to be continued after be-
ing interrupted, this kind of feeling can also enable X to judge 
whether the constraint relation between related representations 
is realized or whether the directed graph structure worked. 
 312 
The inner senses of designators may be based on the phenomenal characters of the mental 313 
representations they denoted so that they may be semantic or analog. For example, we might think 314 
that those conceptual phenomenal characters can be reduced to a kind of inner sense of some ana-315 
log representations. However, even if those inner senses are analog, they can be reduced to a kind 316 
of non-analog/digital inner sense, for the inner senses of designators only needs to play a functional 317 
role in distinguishing different designators in the framework. For example, the traffic light can be 318 
transformed into a device that uses pictures of elephants, monkeys, and giraffes as signals, but it 319 
is not functionally distinct from the three color signals of red, green, and yellow; similarly, the 320 
traffic light can also use red, green, and purple as its signal colors. 321 
4.3 Cognitive Content Phenomenology 322 
 323 
We assign non-structural or structural phenomenology to the constituents of a related mental 324 
representation in different configurations to define different levels of clarity. Different levels of 325 
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clarity are accompanied by different phenomenology, and they are the phenomenology that con-326 
stitutive of the clarity of representations and should be regarded as a part of cognitive content 327 
phenomenology. In detail: 328 
 329 
 c0: c0 representation has no phenomenology. 330 
 c1: c1 representation does not appear independently. 331 
 c2: if X is in a phenomenal state of A(c2). According to the definition, X is in the structural 332 
phenomenal state of A; that is, X is in the non-structural phenomenal state of (i) A, (ii) 333 
the constituents of A, and (iii) the digraph structure of A. 334 
 c3: c3 representation consists of c2 representations (and their structure). Therefore, if we 335 
can explain the phenomenology of c2 representation, we can explain the phenomenology 336 
of c3 representation. 337 
 338 
Thus, if we can explain the cognitive content phenomenology of c2 representation, then we 339 
can explain the cognitive content phenomenology of any high-level mental representation or at 340 
least a separable part of it. 341 
4.4 Reversed Theater Theory  342 
 343 
The Reversed Theater Theory is composed of (i) the Digraph Filling Theory, (ii) the di-344 
graph phenomenology hypothesis, and (iii) a reducibility thesis. 345 
 346 
 Reducibility: Cognitive content phenomenology or at least a separable part of it (i.e., the phe-347 
nomenology that constitutive of the clarity of representations) can be reduced to digraph phe-348 
nomenology and take on a functional role. 349 
 350 
We use the following table to illustrate the details of the transformation from A(c2) to A(c3). 351 
In the table, P1 to P4 are the cognitive content phenomenology related to the clarity; S1 to S4 are 352 








from A(c2) to 
A(c3) 





P1 → S1 
P1: Non-structural 
phenomenology of A 
S1: General inner 
senses of the task 
state 
F1: Make a distinction between 
A and its constituents 
P2 → S2 
P2: Non-structural 
phenomenology of 
the digraph structure 
of A 
S2: Inner senses of the 
digraph structure of 
A(c2) 
F2: Determine the filling order 
of the transformation 
P3 → S3 
P3: Non-structural 
phenomenology of 
the constituents of A 
S3: Inner senses of the 
designators in A(c2)-
framework 
F3: Distinguish different desig-
nators in A(c2)-framework, 
thereby distinguishing different 
constituents of A 
P4 → S4 
P4: Phenomenology 
of the process 
S4: General inner 
senses of the filling 
process 
F4: Combine with other inner 
senses to control and maintain 
the transformation 
 358 
High-level representations are conceptual representations, which makes us tend to think that 359 
the phenomenal characters of them are semantic or analog. Therefore, the internal structure of 360 
those phenomenal characters can hardly be considered as objects of high-level cognitive mecha-361 
nisms (such as the syntactic engine). Formal syntax, not semantics, drives mental computation 362 
forward. Semantics looks epiphenomenal, with syntax doing all the work (Stich, 1983). 363 
According to the Reversed Theater Theory, any mental representation with complicated or 364 
fine-grained conceptual phenomenal character has a simple structural component separated by the 365 
unconscious system and plays a core role in the filling process of the transformation from c2 rep-366 
resentations to c3 representations. Cognitive content phenomenology consists of the inner senses 367 
of the filling process, through which the subject can control and maintain the process. In the sense 368 
that pain can avoid injury and therefore is not epiphenomenal, cognitive content phenomenology 369 
is not epiphenomenal either. Without them, we will lose corresponding information about the 370 
transformation process; neither can we successfully complete the processing of representations, 371 
nor can we resist external interference (for they are long processes). 372 
The Reversed Theater Theory claims that most of the high-level representations are composed 373 
of c2 representations. The phenomenology of them can be reduced to the inner sense that plays a 374 
functional role in transforming c2 representations to c3 representations. In other words, the phe-375 
nomenal characters of representations can be reduced to the inner sense of the high-level pro-376 
cessing process of those representations. The Reversed Cartesian Theater is a theater that the actors 377 
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are the consciousness and the audience is the unconsciousness. The actors (consciousness) me-378 
chanically act according to the script (digraph structure), while the audience (unconsciousness) 379 
enjoys its content. When a performance is over, the audience compiles the next script (digraph 380 
structure) based on their experience so that the stage continues. 381 
In a nutshell, our subjective conscious experience of conceptual contents is mainly realized 382 
by a cycle constituted by a cognitive mechanism; this mechanism involves high-level processing 383 
of mental representations and consists of 4 links. The specific content of the mechanism is as 384 
follows: 385 
 386 
 L1: The overall mental state S1 selects a mental representation R1 that requires conscious pro-387 
cessing. 388 
 L2: The unconscious system transforms the selected representation into the corresponding 389 
digraph framework and sends it to the conscious system. 390 
 L3: The conscious system accepts the digraph framework as input, processes it through the 391 
digraph filling mechanism, and finally outputs the processed new representation R1*. 392 
 L4: S1 transforms itself into a next overall mental state S2 according to R1* and other repre-393 
sentations (such as other beliefs), sub-states (such as interests and action plans), etc. 394 
 (L1: The overall mental state S2 selects a mental representation R2 that requires conscious 395 
processing.) 396 
4.5 Arguments for the Reversed Theater Theory  397 
 398 
Here are some arguments in support of the Reversed Theater Theory: 399 
 400 
1. Zombie argument 401 
 402 
Assuming the Digraph Filling Theory and digraph phenomenology, we try to defend the re-403 
ducibility view. Imagine a partial zombie, Zoe, who has sensory phenomenology, non-content 404 
cognitive phenomenology and digraph phenomenology but does not have any other content cog-405 
nitive phenomenology other than digraph phenomenology. It is difficult for us to imagine the dif-406 
ference between a normal person and such a zombie in any way different from the definition, for 407 
Zoe has qualia and the same high-level cognitive mechanism and abilities as normal humans. 408 
 409 




The Reversed Theater Theory does not presuppose any equipment that is expensive for evo-412 
lution. It proposes two kinds of hardware requirements, a sort of distinctive inner senses and the 413 
abilities to generate digraph structure. 414 
For the former, there may be no cost to get those inner senses of digraph phenomenology. 415 
Like those subtle qualia and visceral pains, it might be byproducts of evolution. For the latter, the 416 
digraph structure has a similar form to causality; we have many methods to find out causality in a 417 
quantified system through the correlations of the system (e.g., Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018; Sugihara 418 
et al., 2012; Runge et al., 2019), and there are examples of artificial neural networks (e.g., Iten et 419 
al., 2020). 420 
 421 
3. Argument from psychopathology 422 
 423 
The Reversed Theater Theory can provide a natural explanation for agnosias such as unilat-424 
eral neglect syndrome and anosognosia. That is, those disorders come from the damage of inner 425 
senses of digraph phenomenology. The related mechanism to which they belong (i.e., digraph fill-426 
ing mechanism) is more fragile than the pure connectionist network, for they play a functional role. 427 
Even if the functions of all sub-systems are normal, damages to those inner senses are enough to 428 
cause cognitive disorders. The information processing abilities of the sub-systems are normal and 429 
"always there," but they are ignored by high-level cognitive mechanisms for they produce wrong 430 
sensory outputs. 431 
5. Intentionality 432 
 433 
The Digraph Filling Theory can not only be combined with digraph phenomenology and the 434 
reducibility thesis to produce the Reversed Theater Theory but also provide a possible approach 435 
to some questions of intentionality. 436 
Intentionality is the aboutness or directedness of the mental state. We refer to mental states 437 
that are directed at things as intentional states. We tend to analyze the misidentification or misrep-438 
resentation from the meta-standpoint but ignore the similar requirement from the first-order-stand-439 
point. It is from that standpoint that we may face some difficulties that the meta-standpoint does 440 
not have. If those difficulties are resolved, it can provide some unique explanations for those dif-441 
ficulties we face in the meta-standpoint. 442 
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When we discuss the veridicality of experiences, the nonveridicality of illusions and halluci-443 
nations is often directly presupposed. However, it is not taken for granted to subjects in actual 444 
cognitive situations. In the actual cognitive situation, it is not "direct" to generate a judgment about 445 
the nonveridicality of the prior experience. 446 
We take the visual illusions caused by anamorphosis as the paradigm of relevant analysis[1]. 447 
For example, an exquisite picture makes someone think that there is a teacup on a table in the room; 448 
an artwork that makes people mistakenly believe that there is a rain puddle in which the blue sky 449 
and the building are reflected. 450 
Suppose that if someone needs to generate a detailed mental representation of a teacup picture 451 
or an artwork of a rain puddle, such as a c3 representation, then there must be a process of trans-452 
forming a c2 representation to the related c3 representation. For example, someone's visual expe-453 
rience of the teacup picture makes her produce a c3 representation of a teacup: Basic visual infor-454 
mation such as the lines, lights, and shadows is processed by the primary visual cortex to give her 455 
a three-dimensional image of a certain object. that image activates her knowledge about "teacup" 456 
and leads her to perceive the object as a teacup. As a result, she obtained a c2 representation of a 457 
teacup. The initial recognition of the object as a teacup will allow her to combine the relevant 458 
visual information (which are the constituents of the c2 representation) with [teacup] to form a 459 
network so that she can attribute such-and-such details to the object, thereby forming a more de-460 
tailed understanding of the teacup. For example, the pattern composed of certain lines determines 461 
the artistic style of the teacup, and the shape of the object illustrates the shape of the teacup (e.g., 462 
the shape "snowdrop"). In addition, she may also add some non-visual representations to it. For 463 
example, according to her knowledge of teacups, the light transmittance and thickness of the tea-464 
cup indicate its material, and the material determines its fragility. All the information as represen-465 
tations, together with the belief that the object is a teacup, forms a network structure as its constit-466 
uents, which is the c3 representation of the teacup. 467 
In the case of misrepresentation, for example, suppose someone produces a c3 representation 468 
A(c3) about a rain puddle at t1, and she perceives a certain kind of nonveridicality through a c3 469 
representation B(c3) about an artwork of a rain puddle at t2. What is the nonveridicality about? If 470 
the answer is that it is the nonveridicality of A(c3), we just give an "intransitive/de dicto" answer; 471 
if the answer is the nonveridicality of the experience of a rain puddle, then can we simply point to 472 
the rain puddle, for example, through A(c3)? 473 
The answer is negative. In short, because A(c3) is composed of its constituents which are 474 
"transformed" by B(c3) at t2 so that A(c3) cannot express any state of affairs in the world at t2. 475 
Suppose A(c2) is the mental representation of the rain puddle (that has been initially recognized), 476 
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and B(c2) is the representation of the rain puddle artwork (that has been initially recognized). A(c2) 477 
and B(c2) are similar in many aspects. On the one hand, they share most of the constituents, such 478 
as the same lines, the same colors, and the same shadows and lights for related visual images—479 
they make significant contributions to the initial recognition of the objects; and on the other hand, 480 
since their formation involves a large number of unconscious and non-conceptual visual represen-481 
tation processing, it can be considered that they have the similar structure. 482 
However, A(c3) and B(c3) are entirely different representations. According to the Digraph 483 
Filling Theory, we regard the c3 representation as obtained by transforming the related c2 repre-484 
sentation through a digraph filling process. Those constituents of a c2 representation "structure" 485 
themselves by combining with the initial recognition of the related object to form a more detailed 486 
understanding of that object. That is to say, the constituents of a c2 representation transform them-487 
selves into c2 representations to transform that c2 representation in question into a c3 representa-488 
tion. For the representation of the rain puddle (i.e., A(c3)), according to the constraint relations it 489 
contains, the bright blue as its reflection must come from the bright blue of the sky, and the sil-490 
houettes of buildings as its reflections must be determined by the surrounding buildings. B(c3) 491 
explained to the subject that the bright blue as its constituent is the blue of pigments of artwork, 492 
and the silhouettes of buildings are the contents of the work. The subject did not notice that today 493 
is cloudy, and there are no buildings around the puddle at t1. Since the subject thinks that B(c3) 494 
represents an actual object, she admits the blue at t1 is the blue of pigments. The blue of pigments 495 
is not a constituent of A(c3), nor the cloudy sky. We call this situation that A(c3) is destroyed by 496 
B(c3) so that A(c3) cannot express the states of affairs of the actual world. 497 
If the subject is aware of the nonveridicality of the experience of that non-exist rain puddle 498 
(it means a kind of de re knowledge), in what way does she do it? Possible world semantics cannot 499 
help her[2]. One suggestion (it is one of many possible treatments) is that the subject constructs a 500 
new representation C(c3) of the rain puddle based on A(c3) and B(c3). C(c3) is a second-order 501 
mental representation. Its first-order content is the same as B(c3) and represents the same object 502 
as B(c3). Its second-order content is the same as A(c3) but refers to B(c3); the subject constructed 503 
it by establishing a natural mapping between the constituents of A(c3) and B(c3) (i.e., a natural 504 
mapping between their A(c2) part and B(c2) part). The intentional state SC corresponding to C(c3) 505 
is a second-order state. It possesses intentionality through its first-order content and is related to 506 
the non-exist rain puddle through its second-order content. She connects the world with specific 507 
content through a second-order representation. 508 
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This paper supports a direct theory of intentionality, which claims that the answer to the re-509 
lated question from the meta-standpoint can be found from the first-order-standpoint. A brief ar-510 
gument is as follows: 511 
 512 
1. A mental representation is a qualified (content) expresser at a specific moment if it is con-513 
sistent in content with other mental representations of the subject at that moment. Otherwise, 514 
it is a failed expresser: it cannot express the states of affairs of the actual world. 515 
2. Only the qualified content expressers can express the intentionality of the related intentional 516 
state. 517 
3. Suppose X is in an intentional state SA with mental representation A as its object at t1, then A 518 
may not be able to determine the intentionality of SA at t2. Because in the cases of misrepre-519 
sentation, A becomes a failed expresser at t2. 520 
4. In that case, A is destroyed by a mental representation B of a later intentional state SB, so A 521 
can no longer express the intentionality of SA. 522 
5. A is destroyed by B so that the relevant subject cannot directly make a judgment that the object 523 
of A is not real.  524 
6. To be able to make such a judgment, she may need to construct a new representation C through 525 
A and B; its first-order content is the same as B, and its second-order content is the same as A 526 
(but refers to B). Therefore, the intentional state SC corresponding to C(c3) has the same in-527 
tentionality as B. 528 
7. The intentionality of SA should be determined by the first-order intentionality of C at t2. 529 
8. In the actual cognitive situations, any intentional state, no matter whether the object of its 530 
mental representation is real or not, has a real intentional object. 531 
9. Any intentional state, no matter whether the object of its mental representation is real or not, 532 
has a real intentional object. 533 
6. Summary 534 
This paper proposed a theory of consciousness called the inverted theater theory, which de-535 
nies consciousness as the inner observer of a privileged position in the brain while retaining its 536 
identity as a participant of cognition by giving it a constitutive functional role in the processing of 537 
representations. Our subjective consciousness experience of conceptual contents is mainly consti-538 
tuted by the cycle of a cognitive mechanism composed of 4 links. In short, the unconscious system 539 
(audience) generates the digraph framework of a selected representation (script) and transmits it 540 
to the conscious system (actors); then, the conscious system generates a new mental representation 541 
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by filling that framework and outputs it to the unconscious system (actors complete the perfor-542 
mance according to the script); the unconscious system transforms itself according to the output 543 
and some of its other representations and states and chooses the next representation that needs to 544 
be processed by the consciousness (the audience writes the next script based on their experience). 545 
In addition, a sub-theory of the Reversed Theater Theory supports a direct theory of intentionality, 546 
which claims that some questions from the meta-standpoint can be answered from the first-order-547 
standpoint. 548 
Endnotes 549 
[1] Other types also exist. For example, we see a crater on a mirror as a sticky material stuck to 550 
it; I presume that someone in front of me is laughing because of a joke I am telling, but what is 551 
happening is that the visual experience of me laughing is passing through her mirror nervous 552 
system and thus stimulating the relevant brain regions. She is laughing without thinking about 553 
anything. 554 
[2] Standard model theory of first-order modal logic requires that all possible worlds have the 555 
same domain D, and some other model theories require that if w'Rw then Dw'⊆ Dw. 556 
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